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Survey
Labor and Employment Discrimination
Cases in the Supreme Court 1989 Term
By TERRY A. BETHEL* and JULIA C. LAMBER**
EVERY YEAR the United States Supreme Court decides a number of
labor and employment discrimination cases. The 1989 Term was no
exception in that respect. This survey discusses 1989 cases of great inter-
est to followers of labor and employment discrimination law.1 Two
things stand out about the 1989 Term. First, with the exception of the
affirmative action, duty of fair representation, and withdrawal of recogni-
tion cases, most of the decisions were noncontroversial, in contrast to
cases decided in other years. Second, it was Justice Brennan's last year
on the Court. He was a major force in both labor and employment dis-
crimination cases. His ability to mold majorities from divergent points of
view, illustrated in the Term's affirmative action case, will be missed.
* Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. B.A., 1968, J.
D., 1971, Ohio State University.
** Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. B.A., 1969, DePauw
University; J.D., 1972, Indiana University-Bloomington. We are grateful for the research
assistance of Janet McInnis.
1. Perhaps the most noted case we omit is Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729
(1990), in which the Court found, by a five to four vote, that the first amendment bars public
employers from basing decisions to hire, promote, transfer, or recall low level employees on
political affiliation. Other cases include Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct.
2668 (1990) (upholding involuntary post-termination restoration of an ERISA-covered pen-
sion plan imposed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation); English v. General Elec.
Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990) (discharged employee's state law tort claim not preempted by
federal whistleblower statute); Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997 (1990) (severance
payments made to defense contractor employees upon resignation to accept lower paying gov-
ernment positions did not violate conflict of interest statute); United States Dep't of Labor v.
Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990) (Black Lung Benefits Act's regulation of attorney's fees does
not violate due process); IRS v. FLRA, 110 S. Ct. 1623 (1990) (proposal to arbitrate disputes
over contracting out agency work is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining for fed-
eral agencies).
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I. Labor Law Cases
A. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association Local
Union No. 6.2
In Breininger, the Court held that a union member's cause of action
for breach of the duty of fair representation was not preempted by the
National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") jurisdiction over unfair la-
bor practice charges.3 The Court also held that the plaintiff failed to
establish a claim of unlawful union discipline under the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 4 because he had not
alleged discipline by the union as an entity, but rather only by individual
union officials. 5
The judicially created duty of fair representation requires that a
union recognized as the exclusive representative of an employee bargain-
ing unit fairly represent all employees in the unit, without hostile dis-
crimination against any of them.6 Typical claims alleging breach of the
duty of fair representation arise in the context of positions taken by un-
ions in collective bargaining or grievance processing. In addition to giv-
ing an employee a private cause of action, a breach of the duty of fair
representation may be the basis of an unfair labor practice charge against
the union.7
Generally, neither state nor federal courts may assert jurisdiction
over claims comprising unfair labor practices as defined in the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")8 because the NLRB has exclusive juris-
diction.9 The United States Supreme Court has previously held, how-
ever, that breach of the duty of fair representation claims are not
preempted by the NLRB's jurisdiction. 10
In Breininger, the plaintiff alleged that the union breached its duty
of fair representation by discriminating against him in making job refer-
rals from a union hiring hall. 11 Under the union's job referral arrange-
ment, an employer contacting the hiring hall was entitled to ask for
2. 110 S. Ct. 424 (1989).
3. Id. at 429-33.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
5. Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 440.
6. See e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,
323 U.S. 248 (1944).
7. Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 429 (citing Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962),
enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963)).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
9. Id. (citing San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
10. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
11. Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 428.
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individual union members by name.1 2 The plaintiff alleged that the
union had refused to honor such employer requests for his services, and
had refused to process his internal grievances over this claim. 13 Plaintiff
further alleged that he had been disciplined as a result of his political
opposition to the union's officers, thus giving rise to a claim under the
LMRDA.14
The district court dismissed the case, holding that discrimination in
hiring hall referrals is an unfair labor practice, and therefore that plain-
tiff's claim for breach of the duty of fair representation was preempted by
the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction.' 5 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating
that fair representation claims must be brought to the NLR.B as unfair
labor practice cases, and that an employee cannot prevail in a duty of fair
representation claim against a union unless he or she also claims that the
employer breached the collective bargaining agreement. 16
The Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming its view that a duty of fair
representation claim is not preempted even though the conduct com-
plained of might also be an unfair labor practice.17 The Court observed
that the duty of fair representation doctrine had been judicially created
before the NLRB ever acquired jurisdiction over such claims.18 The
Court also questioned whether the NLRB had any more expertise on
such problems than the courts. 9 The Court expressed a further concern
that the NLRB's General Counsel could frustrate the policy of the fair
representation doctrine by exercising its discretion to refuse to prosecute
charges that a union had breached the duty.20 Preserving the right of
individual employees to be made whole for breaches of the duty was of
paramount importance to the Court.21
As it had done in Vaca v. Sipes,22 the Court noted that when it first
recognized the doctrine of the duty of fair representation, there were no
union unfair labor practices under the NLRA.2 3 Further, nothing Con-
gress had done in amending the NLRA to establish union unfair labor
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 428-29. The Sixth Circuit also dismissed the LMRDA portion of the com-
plaint. Id.
17. Id. at 430.
18. Id. at 429.
19. Id. at 429-30.
20. Id. at 430.
21. Id. (citing Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 222 (1983)).
22. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
23. 110 S. Ct. at 429.
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practices indicated, that Congress had intended to divest courts of juris-
diction over duty of fair representation claims.24
The Court then addressed the contention that, in hiring hall cases, it
should recognize an exception to its general view of duty of fair represen-
tation preemption, because hiring hall operations is an area with which
the NLRB has substantial familiarity. The Court responded that it had
never intimated that concurrent judicial jurisdiction over duty of fair rep-
resentation claims was based on the extent of NLRB expertise on the
subject matter of such claims.25 Moreover, the Court stated, creating an
exception in all areas of duty of fair representation law in which the
NLRB has expertise or experience would remove an unacceptably large
number of such cases from the federal courts.26
The Supreme Court also rejected the Sixth Circuit's holding that an
employee could not maintain a successful duty of fair representation suit
against a union unless the employee also alleged a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement by the employer.27 The Court noted simply that
"[t]his is a misstatement of existing law."' 28 There is, however, some jus-
tification for the lower court's confusion. Indeed, in another duty of fair
representation case decided this term - Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers,
Local v. Terry 29 - the Court stated that in order to prevail in a duty of
fair representation case against a union, the plaintiff does ordinarily need
to prove that the employer violated the collective bargaining agree-
ment.30 This requirement only applies in certain types of duty of fair
representation claims, however. The most common claim for breach of
the duty of fair representation involves an allegation that the union has
violated its duty in processing employee grievances, either by refusing to
take an employee's grievance case to arbitration, or by mishandling a
case at arbitration. In these cases, to establish that the union's conduct
affects the employee, the plaintiff is required to prove both that the em-
ployer violated her contractual rights, and that the union breached its
duty of fair representation by failing to adequately protect her rights.3
Not every duty of fair representation case, however, depends on an alle-
gation that an employer violated an employee's rights. In the case creat-
24. Id. at 430.
25. Id. at 431.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 432.
28. Id.
29. 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990).
30. Id. at 1344.
31. Id.
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ing the duty, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,32 the union
breached its duty in the collective bargaining process by negotiating con-
tract terms which discriminated against black workers on the basis of
race.33
In Breininger, the plaintiff did not claim that the employer violated
any contractual obligation owed to him, but rather that the union's dis-
criminatory operation of the hiring hall violated its duty of fair represen-
tation. The allegation did not implicate the employer. The Court found,
therefore, that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to sue the employer in
order prevail against the union.34
The union, however, had another argument. In Vaca, the Court had
established that suits against an employer and a union that relate to the
same claim should be heard in the same forum. In the hiring hall situa-
tion in Breininger, the union contended that a claim against the employer
would not be tried as a breach of contract, but instead on an unfair labor
practice claim, alleging discrimination on the basis of union membership
under the NLRA's section 8(a)(3). 35 If the union violated section
8(b)(1)(A) by its improper referral practices, and the employer violated
8(a)(3), they would then be held jointly and severally liable, but only in
an action before the NLRB. 36 Since the 8(a)(3) claim is clearly within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, the union argued, the breach of
duty of fair representation against it should be preempted in favor of
NLRB jurisdiction since that would serve the interest advanced in Vaca
of keeping similar actions in the same forum.37
The Court rejected this argument, stating that the union mis-
perceived the reasoning of Vaca, which does not require that a plaintiff
sue the union in order to prevail against an employer in a contract ac-
tion. 38 It merely holds that one cannot win against the employer without
also proving a breach of the duty of fair representation. This require-
ment is not based on a policy of implicating unions in the suit but rather
is in deference to arbitration as the agreed-upon exclusive remedy. 39 In
essence, an employee cannot sue the employer successfully unless the ar-
bitration process has broken down. Proving a breach of the duty of fair
32. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
33. Id. at 195, 202-03.
34. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 110 S. Ct. 424,433
(1989).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 434.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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representation is how one establishes a break-down of the arbitration
process. Thus, proof of the breach of the duty is an integral part of the
action against the employer. In the hiring hall case, however, there is no
requirement that the employee proceed against both the employer and
the union; the employee can proceed against either or both. And, unlike
the situation in Vaca, proof of a violation by one is not a necessary com-
ponent in a case against the other.40
The Court also held, seven to two, that the plaintiff had not estab-
lished an LMRDA claim. 41 Sections 101 and 609 of the LMRDA make
it unlawful for a union to fine, suspend, expel or "otherwise discipline" a
member for exercising rights protected by the LMRDA.42 The plaintiff
contended that by failing to refer him to jobs in retaliation for his polit-
ical opposition of the union leadership, the union had disciplined him
within the meaning of sections 101 and 609. 43 The Court found, how-
ever, that the plaintiff had not alleged that the union, as an entity, had
taken action against him, but rather only that the union's business man-
ager and business agent had retaliated against him.44 The Court read the
words "otherwise discipline" in the LMRDA action narrowly, as not en-
compassing all actions taken by a union officer that might disadvantage a
member of the union.45 Rather, relying on the structure of the Act and
its legislative history, the Court found that what is banned is punishment
authorized by the union as an entity,46 to enforce its rules. In this case,
the plaintiff was not punished by a union tribunal and had not been the
subject of proceedings convened by the union itself. What he really al-
leged was a vendetta undertaken by two officers of the union. That was
not, the Court concluded, what Congress meant by use of the term "dis-
cipline" in the LMRDA.47
Justices Stevens and Scalia dissented. 48 They found that punish-
ment imposed by someone in control, with a view toward correcting be-
havior that is thought to be deviant, is discipline within the meaning of
the LMRDA.49 The plaintiff's allegation, they concluded, was within
this definition as the punishment was imposed under color of union au-
40. Id.
41. Id. at 440.
42. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1988); id.
§ 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1988).
43. Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 428.
44. Id. at 440.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 439-440.
47. Id. at 440.
48. Id. at 440-44.
49. Id. at 441.
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thority, and because operation of the hiring hall fell to the union as a
result of its status as exclusive representative.50 They considered per-
verse the majority's assertion that the alleged conduct was not discipline
because there had been no union tribunal or proceedings involved. 51
They further observed that the majority's construction deprived the em-
ployee and union member of his rights at the very time when he needed
them most - when the union acts secretly and without advance notice.52
B. Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry 53
Terry was another duty of fair representation case which ultimately,
like Breininger,54 involved an action against a union only. In Terry, how-
ever, the Court's concern was with whether the plaintiffs were entitled to
a jury trial. Affirming decisions of the district court and the Fourth Cir-
cuit, the Court held that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial under the
seventh amendment to the United States Constitution. 55
The Terry case arose from a change of operation by the McLean
Trucking Company that involved closing several terminals and displac-
ing union-represented drivers. Pursuant to the change of operation, the
plaintiff drivers were transferred to a terminal in North Carolina and
granted special seniority rights over drivers who were then on temporary
lay-off from the terminal.5 6 The plaintiffs were subsequently also laid off,
and filed a grievance alleging the company had abused the applicable
layoff and recall procedures. 57 Their first grievance was successful, and
the plaintiffs were ordered reinstated with backpay. 58 A second griev-
ance, also alleging improper layoffs, was denied by the joint grievance
committee. 59 The union declined to process the plaintiffs' third grievance
to the joint committee, on the ground that it presented the same issues
that had been decided adversely to plaintiffs in the second grievance. 6°
The plaintiffs then sued both the employer, claiming breach of contract,
and the union, claiming a breach of the duty of fair representation. 61
50. Id. at 443.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990).
54. 110 S. Ct. 424 (1989).
55. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1349.
56. Id. at 1343.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Again, they sought backpay and reinstatement. 62 They also demanded a
jury trial.63
The employer subsequently declared bankruptcy, and plaintiffs vol-
untarily dismissed their action against it.64 That left the union as the
only defendant, and the backpay claim as the only remedy sought.
The district court denied a motion by the union to strike the jury
trial demands, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 65 Granting review to
resolve a conflict among courts of appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed
the lower courts' decisions.
Initially, the Court noted that the seventh amendment preserves a
party's right to a jury trial with respect to actions in which legal, as op-
posed to equitable, rights are to be determined. 66 To determine whether
an action is one involving legal rights, entitling a party to a jury trial, or
equitable rights, the Court employs a two step analysis. 67 First, the
Court looks to the nature of the issues involved, to determine whether
they are legal or equitable. 68 Second, the Court considers the nature of
the remedy sought. 69 The second inquiry - into whether the remedy is
legal or equitable - is more important than the first. 70
In addressing the first inquiry, the Court was unable to reach a con-
sensus on whether the nature of the plaintiffs' cause of action was legal or
equitable.7' Eight justices agreed that the Court should compare the
cause of action for breach of duty of fair representation to causes of ac-
tion that pre-existed the merger of courts of law and equity, and then
determine whether the most comparable pre-merger action was legal or
equitable in nature.72 Seven justices agreed the duty of fair representa-
tion action against a union most closely resembled an action by a trust
beneficiary against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, an equitable
action that does not carry the right to trial by jury. 73 Justice Stevens
thought the breach of the duty of fair representation claim most closely
resembled a malpractice action against an attorney, an action at law to
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1344.
67. Id. at 1345.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1347.
72. Id. at 1345.
73. Id. at 1346.
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which the right to a jury trial does attach.74 Justice Brennan did not
think the Court should attempt the comparable action inquiry at all, and
questioned the Court's competence to make such determinations.5
While seven justices thought the breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation action most closely resembled an equitable action, a plurality of
four decided that this characterization was not the end of the inquiry.76
The right to a jury trial, they said, depends on the nature of the specific
issues to be tried rather than the character of the overall action.77 The
issues to be tried in this case were not only whether the union had
breached its duty, but also whether the employer had breached the con-
tract.78 Because the breach of contract claim is a legal action, not an
equitable one, these four justices found the inquiry into the nature of the
action inconclusive, as the relevant issues were both equitable and legal.7 9
Turning to the second inquiry, the Court noted that the only remedy
sought in the case was backpay, because the claim against the employer
had been dismissed. 80 Ordinarily, an action seeking only money damages
is considered legal in nature. It is true, the Court said, that backpay is
sometimes seen as an equitable remedy, but those are situations where
the remedy is restitutionary.8 1 That was not the case here, because the
union had not wrongfully withheld pay and was not being asked to dis-
gorge.8 2 A claim for damages may also be regarded as an equitable rem-
edy where it is closely intertwined with, or incidental to, a demand for
injunctive relief, but that was not the case here either.83
The union argued that because Congress had characterized backpay
as an equitable remedy in Title VII,84 the Court should afford it the same
status in a breach of the duty of fair representation action.85 The Court
rejected this argument, observing that Congress had not passed any legis-
lation in which it referred to backpay as an equitable remedy in the con-
text of claims for breach of the duty of fair representation. 86 Further, in
74. Id. at 1353.
75. Id. at 1350.
76. Id. at 1347.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1347.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1348.
82. Id. at 1348.
83. Id.
84. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1988).
85. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1348.
86. Id. at 1349.
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Title VII cases, backpay is generally sought from the employer, and is
therefore restitutionary8 7 The Court concluded that "certainly" it was
not required to find a parallel connection between Title VII damages and
damages for breach of the duty of fair representation.88 Because the
Court concluded that the backpay remedy sought was legal in nature, it
found the plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on their claim against the
union.8 9
C. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles 90
In Golden State Transit, the Court held that damages may be
awarded under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ("section 1983") 91 against govern-
ment bodies that regulate aspects of collective bargaining relationships
that are intended to be left unregulated under the NLRA.92
An earlier phase of the Golden State Transit litigation had been
heard by the Court in 1986 ("Golden State I ).93 The dispute in Golden
State I had arisen when the Los Angeles city council conditioned exten-
sion of a taxi cab franchise to the employer on its success in settling a
labor dispute with its striking drivers. 94 The franchise ultimately lapsed
when the employer and the Teamsters Union failed to reach agreement.
The employer thereafter brought suit against the city council. 9
In Golden State I, the Court held that the city's action in condition-
ing extension of the franchise on the strike settlement was prohibited
under the so-called Machinists preemption line of cases, which preempts
state or local regulation of those aspects of union-employer relations that
Congress intended to be left unregulated. 96 The NLRA is intended to
provide for a system of free collective bargaining in which government
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 110 S. Ct. 444 (1989).
91. Section 1983 was originally passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. It pro-
vides, in relevant part, that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects... any citizen.., to the deprivation of any
ights... secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
92. Golden State Transit, 110 S. Ct. 448-52.
93. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
94. Id. at 611.
95. Id.
96. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1972). In Machinists, the Court held that federal labor
policy preempts local government efforts to regulate peaceful economic action by parties to a
labor dispute, and reversed a Wisconsin state labor agency order enjoining a union's concerted
refusal to work overtime.
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has no substantive role in determining particular terms of employment.
Towards this end, the NLRA allows the parties to engage in economic
actions such as strikes and lockouts in support of the positions they take
at the bargaining table. Although states remain free to regulate violence
and certain other forms of misconduct, under the Machinists preemption
doctrine they cannot restrict the parties' peaceful economic actions.
On remand following the Court's Golden State I decision, the dis-
trict court ordered the city to reinstate the employer's franchise.97 The
district court denied the employer's damage claim, however, holding that
there was no cause of action under section 1983.98 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 99
In Golden State Transit, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court
initially reviewed the history of its prior application of section 1983,
which creates state and local government liability for actions that are
carried out under the color of law and which deprive citizens of "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws .... .100
The Court noted that to establish section 1983 liability, a plaintiff must
show the violation of a federal right.101 The employer, the Court said,
satisfied that requirement in this case, because it was the intended benefi-
ciary of a federal statutory scheme intended to prevent government inter-
ference with the collective bargaining processes.102 Moreover, there was
no administrative enforcement scheme to protect that right under the
NLRA, since the NLRB has jurisdiction only over employers and un-
ions, and cannot address government interference.10 3
Justice Kennedy dissented, and was joined by Justices O'Connor
and Rehnquist. °4 The dissent argued that it is one thing to hold that
federal law preempts local regulation, but quite another to hold that pre-
emption also creates a damage action where the actions of the local gov-
ernment were not in derogation of a specifically enumerated federal
statutory right. Congress, Justice Kennedy said, did not intend to create
liability when the state's only sin was "misapprehending the precise loca-
tion of the boundaries between state and federal power."' 05
97. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444, 447 (1989) (citing
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 660 F. Supp. 571 (C.D. Cal. 1987)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 448.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
101. Golden State Transit Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 448.
102. Id. at 450.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 452.
105. Id. at 453.
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Golden State Transit may limit the practical ability of labor organi-
zations to bring pressure on employers doing business with government
entities by appealing to those governments for support. The case does
not preclude a local government from refusing to do business with an
employer that has a dispute with a union, but it does limit the ability of
local governments to take actions that could be considered coercive of a
party's bargaining position. It will also cause caution among state and
local governments that are pressured by either employers or unions to
take a stand about their labor disputes.
D. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. 106
The Supreme Court has long held that employers can permanently
replace workers who strike in support of bargaining demands, and that
such replacements need not be displaced to accommodate strikers wish-
ing to return to work at the conclusion of a strike. 10 7 The Court has also
long recognized that employers can withdraw recognition of a union
based on a "good faith doubt" that the union enjoys the continued sup-
port of a majority of employees. 08 In NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scien-
tific, Inc., the Court considered an important aspect of how these two
rules interact.
The Curtin Matheson court upheld an NLRB ruling in which the
NLRB refused to presume that strike replacements oppose union repre-
sentation when evaluating an employer's alleged "good faith doubt" of
majority union status.1°9 As a result, the mere fact that a majority of
workers in a post-strike workforce were hired as strike replacements will
not be sufficient to justify an employer's withdrawal of recognition.
Employers typically assert the good faith doubt withdrawal of rec-
ognition doctrine at the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.
At that point, an employer might refuse to bargain with the union and,
when charged with an unfair labor practice under NLRA section 8(a)(5),
defend itself by claiming that it doubts about the union's majority sta-
tus. 0 For this defense to be effective, the asserted doubt must be based
on objective considerations and cannot represent merely the employer's
opinion that the employees do not support the union."'
106. 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990).
107. Id. at 1551.
108. Id. at 1545.
109. Id. at 1554.
110. See e.g., Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir.
1989).
111. Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1545.
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The NLRB generally presumes that new employees hired into a bar-
gaining unit support the union in the same proportion as the employees
already there. 11 2 That presumption has not always held true for strike
replacements. For as many as twenty-five years, the NLRB presumed
that replacements did not support the union. 1 3 In 1975, however, the
NLRB held that strike replacements, like new employees generally,
should be presumed to support the union in the same ratio as the strikers
they replaced.11 4 In Station KKHI,115 the NLRB recently decided to re-
ject altogether the use of presumptions in determining strike replace-
ments' union sentiments. 1 6 Rather, the NLRB decided it would
thereafter assess replacement workers' union sentiments on a case-by-
case basis.11 7 The validity of the Station KKHI approach was the central
issue in Curtin Matheson.
The Teamsters union represented twenty-seven employees of the
Curtin Matheson Scientific Company in May 1979 when it began a strike
in support of bargaining demands.1 18  Five employees immediately
crossed the picket line, leaving twenty-two employees on strike.1 19
About two weeks later, the employer hired twenty-nine permanent
replacements.1 20 Three weeks later, the union announced that it was
ending the strike and offered to accept unconditionally the last offer
made before the strike began.1 21 The employer informed the union that
the offer had been withdrawn, and then withdrew recognition from the
union, saying it doubted the union's continued majority status. 122 The
union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the employer, chal-
lenging the withdrawal of recognition. An administrative law judge
found no violation, but the NLRB reversed, concluding that the em-
ployer did not have a sufficient objective basis on which to doubt the
union's majority status.1 23
The NLRB refused to presume that the five striking employees who
crossed the picket line had forsaken the union, noting that their failure to
support the strike might have been based on economic concerns rather
112. Id.
113. Id. (discussing status of Board rule from 1959 to 1974 and citing cases).
114. Id. at 1546 (citing Cutten Supermarket, 220 N.L.R.B. 507 (1975)).
115. 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987).
116. Id. at 1344.
117. Id.
118. Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1547.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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than opposition to the union. 124 The employer claimed that other inci-
dents also supported its good faith doubt of the union's majority status.
Two employees, including the chief. shop steward, had resigned from
their jobs after the strike began, 125 and six other employees had made
statements during the strike that were critical of the union. 126  The
NLRB, however, found that these facts did not necessarily indicate op-
position to the union; the resignations did not evidence declining union
support at all, and the employee statements criticizing the union were
'ambiguous at best.' ",127
The employer's primary evidence supporting its good faith doubt
was the fact that strike replacements comprised more than half of the
post-strike bargaining unit. Applying its Station KKHI approach, the
NLRB refused to presume replacements opposed the union. 128 Instead,
the NLRB required that the employer submit evidence of their lack of
support for the union. 129 The only such evidence presented was a report
by a company official of a conversation with one replacement worker.
The NLRB found this insufficient.13 0 Because the employer failed ade-
quately to support its contention of good faith doubt of the union's con-
tinued majority status, it failed to rebut the NLRB's general presumption
of continuing majority support for the union. The NLRB held therefore
that the employer's withdrawal of recognition violated sections 8 (a)(1)
and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, and ordered the Company to resume bargain-
ing.' 3' The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the NLRB's order, and
specifically rejected the NLRB's presumption about replacement
workers. 32
The Supreme Court noted initially that it has long accorded consid-
erable deference to the NLRB's rules. In recognition of the NLRB's
"primary responsibility for developing and applying national labor pol-
icy," the Court generally upholds NLRB rules as long as they are "ra-
tional and consistent with the Act."' 133 Such deference is afforded, the
Court stated, even where an NLRB rule departs from the NLRB's prior
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1548.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1549.
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policy, for an evolutionary approach is appropriate in administrative
rulemaking. 134
The Court found that the NLRB's rejection of an antiunion pre-
sumption was rational as an empirical matter, because replacements do
not inevitably oppose unions. 135 Replacement workers may be forced by
economic necessity "to work for a struck employer even though [they]
otherwise support[] the union and want[] the benefits of union
representation." 36
The Court acknowledged that unions' goals in strike situations are
often hostile to the interests of replacements, as unions often seek dis-
charge of replacements to assure reinstatement of strikers. 137 The em-
ployer argued that replacement workers will therefore most likely not
support a union, and that a presumption of union opposition is therefore
appropriate. 38 The Court noted, however, that unions do not invariably
demand displacement of all replacement workers. 39 A union may, the
Court stated, lack the necessary bargaining power to obtain that goal. 14
A post-strike workforce may consist in part of replacements who, though
not supportive of the past strike, nonetheless desire the union's ongoing
representation in grievance processing and future bargaining.'
4
'
Although replacements often will not support the union, the Court con-
cluded, it was "not irrational for the NLRB to conclude that the
probability of . . . opposition is insufficient to justify an antiunion
presumption."'' 42
The Court also noted that the NLRB's approach is consistent with
the "Act's 'overriding policy' of achieving 'industrial peace.'"143 The
refusal to adopt a presumption that replacements are antiunion promotes
industrial peace, the Court reasoned, because by limiting "the employers'
ability to oust a union without adducing any evidence of ... employees'
union sentiments [it] encourages negotiated solutions to strikes."' 44
Adoption of an antiunion presumption, by contrast, would allow employ-
134. Id. (citing NLRB v. J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975)).
135. Id. at 1550.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1551.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1551-52.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1553.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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ers to "eliminate the union merely by hiring a sufficient number of re-
placement employees." 145
In his dissenting opinion,146 Justice Scalia criticized the Court for
not addressing the employer's contentions that it had established a rea-
sonable good faith doubt about the union's majority status, and that
there was no substantial evidence to support the NLRB's contrary con-
clusion. 147 The majority only addressed whether the NLRB must pre-
sume that striker replacements oppose the union in determining whether
an employer has sufficient objective evidence of good faith doubt. 148
Scalia noted that in another case dealing with a slightly different
issue, the NLRB had characterized the interest of the strikers and re-
placement employees as "diametrically opposed."' 49 In recognition of
this tension, the NLRB had in one case decided that an employer did not
need to negotiate with an incumbent union about the terms and condi-
tions of employment for replacements.15 0 In another instance, the
NLRB had relieved a union of its duty of fair representation for replace-
ment employees when the union demanded that replacements be fired to
make way for returning strikers. 51
Scalia found it anomalous that the NLRB would recognize the con-
flict between strikers and replacements in these earlier cases, yet deny
that it existed for purposes of determining majority support in Curtin
Matheson.152 Scalia asserted that Curtin Matheson did not have to
demonstrate an absolute assurance that a majority of the bargaining unit
did not support the union. Rather, it merely needed to advance a "rea-
sonable doubt."' 53 Scalia concluded "[i]t seems absurd to ... deny that
it sustained that burden."1 54
E. United Steelworkers v. Rawson 155
In Rawson, the Court found that state wrongful death claims against
a union were preempted by federal law under section 301 of the Labor
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1557.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1544.
149. Id. at 1559 (quoting Beacon Upholstery Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1360, 1368 (1976)).
150. Id. (citing Service Elec. Co., 281 N.L.R.B. 633, 641 (1986)).
151. Id. (citing Leveld Wholesale, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1350 (1975)).
152. Id. at 1563.
153. Id. at 1557.
154. Id. at 1562.
155. 110 S. Ct. 1904 (1990).
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Management Relations Act ("section 301").156 Rawson also found that
the plaintiffs had not presented valid claims for breach of contract, ' 57 or
breach of the duty of fair representation.158
To understand Rawson, it is helpful to return to the Court's 1987
decision in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hechler.159
In that case, an injured employee sued her union in tort, claiming that it
had breached its duty to provide a safe workplace.160 The Hechler court
found that this claim was preempted by section 301 because its resolution
depended substantially on an analysis of a labor contract's terms.161 The
Court pointed out that typically the employer owes a duty to provide a
safe workplace, 162 and that unions assume such a duty only when specifi-
cally mentioned in a contract. Because a court would have to interpret
the contract in order to consider the plaintiff's state claim, it was pre-
empted by federal law under section 301.
At the time when the Supreme Court decided Hechler, the union
had filed its petition for certiorari in Rawson.163 The Supreme Court of
Idaho had concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted by
federal law. ,64 The United States Supreme Court vacated that judgment
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Hechler.165 On remand, the
Idaho court reconsidered, but, distinguishing Hechler, again decided that
the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted, and the United States Supreme
Court again granted certiorari. 166
Rawson involved wrongful death claims brought on behalf of four
miners who were killed in a mine fire in 1972.167 The plaintiffs alleged
156. Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). Section 301 pro-
vides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce .. . may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id.
157. Rawson, 110 S. Ct. at 1912.
158. Id. at 1913.
159. 481 U.S. 851 (1987).
160. One assumes that at least one motive for litigation of this type is to find a defendant,
since the employer will typically be liable only under the state's worker compensation scheme,
where damages are not generous.
161. Hechler, 481 U.S. at 862 (relying on Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202
(1985)).
162. Id.
163. Rawson, 110 S. Ct. at 1908.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1908-09.
167. Id. at 1907.
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that the union had inspected the mine, as allowed by the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, but had not exercised due care in con-
ducting those inspections. 168
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized a state cause of action, rea-
soning that if one renders services to another, "even gratuitously," that
he recognizes are necessary to the other's protection, he is subject to lia-
bility if he fails to exercise reasonable care.169 The state court distin-
guished Hechler by asserting that whether the union in Hechler had been
bound by a duty to provide a safe workplace had depended primarily on
the scope of the union's responsibilities under the contract. 70 In Raw-
son, according to the Idaho Supreme Court, the scope of the union's duty
was not an issue.' 7' The union had inspected the workplace, and the
plaintiffs claimed that it had done so negligently; the cause of action was
premised on that negligent conduct. 72 The Idaho Supreme Court found
no reason to look to the collective bargaining agreement to determine the
scope of the union's duty, since it could resolve the negligence issue with-
out interpreting the contract. 173
The Supreme Court reversed. The majority began its preemption
discussion by reiterating its previous holding that if a duty is owed em-
ployees only because of a collective bargaining agreement, then the scope
of the duty is a matter of federal law. 174 The Court said that the only
possible interpretation of the plaintiffs' pleadings was that the duty as-
sumed by the union depended on the collective bargaining agreement.' 7,T
The Idaho court had said that it made no difference why the union
had inspected the mine, because under Idaho law, even volunteers could
be held liable if they have negligently undertaken certain actions. 76
Under this view, there is no reason to look at the collective bargaining
agreement at all. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the duty
the union was alleged to have violated was not independent of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 77 The union was not alleged to have acted in
a way that would violate a duty of reasonable care to every member of
society, meaning that the alleged duty was owed only to employees repre-
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1908-09.
170. Id. at 1908.
171. Id. at 1910.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1909.
175. Id. at 1910.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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sented by the union. 178 Moreover, the Idaho court had not said that any
visitor to the mine had a duty to report a dangerous condition. 179 Only
the collective bargaining agreement can impose such a duty on a union;
whether an agreement imposes this duty is a federal law question.18 0 In
short, the preemptive force of federal law could not be avoided, the Court
said, by characterizing the union's duty as one growing out of state
law.18 1
The Court determined that if the claim was to proceed, it could do
so only as a matter of federal law.182 The union asserted that the claim
was invalid because under federal law the only duty it had to the employ-
ees was the duty of fair representation, which it could not breach by mere
negligence. 183 The union also urged that its members could not sue it for
breach of contract under section 301 since the duty of fair representation
has statutory, not contractual, origins. In any event, the union claimed
that it had made no enforceable promise to the bargaining unit employ-
ees when it inspected the mine. 8
The Supreme Court first endorsed the view accepted by most appel-
late courts that mere negligence is not enough to violate the duty of fair
representation.18 5 The Court did not agree, however, that the union's
sole responsibility to employees is the duty of fair representation. It
noted that it had never held that a union cannot assume additional duties
to represented employees. Unions may, in the Court's view, assume du-
ties which have traditionally been viewed as management
responsibilities. '8 6
The Court emphasized caution, however, "lest courts be precipitate
in their efforts to find unions contractually bound to employees by collec-
tive bargaining agreements." 8 7 To establish that a union owes a duty
greater than the duty of fair representation, the Court stated, the em-
ployee must point to language in the collective bargaining agreement spe-
cifically indicating an intent to create obligations enforceable by
individual employees against the union.188
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1911.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1912.
188. Id.
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The contract in Rawson provided only that a committee of union
members and supervisors "shall inspect" the mine. 1 9 The Court found
that this promise was not made to employees and was not enforceable by
them. Rather, it was a promise solely between the union and the em-
ployer, and enforceable only by them. The Court stated that to confer
employee rights enforceable against the union, a contract must include
some indication that the right was to be enforceable by individual em-
ployees. That the contract imposes a duty on the union merely by saying
it "shall" act is, presumably, not enough. 19
The Court also suggested that unions could be held liable by em-
ployees as third party beneficiaries of promises made by unions to em-
ployers. 191 In Rawson there was no such liability, however, because third
party beneficiaries have no greater rights than the promisee, and the
union had made no promise to the employer. 192 Rather, the effect of the
inspection provision was merely for the employer to surrender to the
union part of its responsibility for safety. 193
Rawson is a significant victory for the union. The Supreme Court
rejected a state court's attempt to allow recovery against a union through
clever pleading. And the Court held that negligent conduct is not
enough to violate the duty of fair representation. But the Court also
raised the possibility of union liability on other theories that clearly will
not escape the attention of the plaintiffs' bar. There is no question that in
the not-too-distant future, the Court will have to revisit some of the is-
sues it raised in Rawson.
II. Employment Discrimination Cases
In its 1988 term, the Court decided several controversial employ-
ment discrimination cases. Those decisions became catalysts for Con-
gressional enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which was vetoed
by President Bush. Most of the 1989 term's employment discrimination
cases, by contrast, were noncontroversial, technical in nature, and unani-
mous. The one exception is Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission, an affirmative action case that was decided on the last
day of the term.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1912-13.
192. Id. at 1913.
193. Id.
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A. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling 194
In Hoffman-La Roche, the Court held that district courts may act to
facilitate notice to absent class members of class actions brought under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 195 The Court
approved a district court order directing a defendant employer to pro-
duce names and addresses of absent class members, and authorizing
plaintiffs to send a notice to them. 196
The ADEA allows employees to bring an action on behalf of them-
selves and other employees similarly situated, but requires that individual
class members file written consents with the court to become party to
such an action. 197 In Hoffman-La Roche, the employer ordered a reduc-
tion in force and discharged or demoted some 1200 workers. 198 Richard
Sperling, a discharged employee, filed an age discrimination charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 99 He and other em-
ployees mailed a letter to some 600 employees whom they had identified
as potential members of the protected class. 2°° Sperling and others then
filed an ADEA action in federal district court and received over 400 con-
sents. The plaintiffs moved for discovery of the names and addresses of
all similarly situated employees and for the court to send notice to all
potential plaintiffs who had not yet filed consents. 20
The district court ordered the employer to produce the names and
addresses of the discharged employees. 202 The court also authorized the
plaintiffs to send to all employees who had not yet joined the suit a notice
and a consent document.20 3 At the end of the notice was a statement
that it had been authorized by the district court, but that the court had
taken no position on the merits of the case.2°4 The Third Circuit af-
firmed the discovery order and the order for further notice, ruling that
"there is no legal impediment to court-authorized notice in an appropri-
ate case."'
20 5
194. 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989).
195. Id. at 486-88.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 486 (citing Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1982) (amended 1988)).
198. Id. at 485.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 486.
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In a seven to two decision, with Justice Kennedy writing for the
majority, the Supreme Court affirmed. 206 The Court found that district
courts have discretion to decide whether to play any role in prescribing
the terms and conditions of communication from named plaintiffs to the
potential members of the class on whose behalf a collective action has
been brought. 207 According to Justice Kennedy, trial courts are always
involved in the notice process multi-plaintiff cases requiring mass written
consent. Thus, district courts have the discretion to begin their involve-
ment at the notice stage.208 "By monitoring preparation and distribution
of the notice, a court can ensure that it is timely, accurate, and informa-
tive."' 2°9 District courts must take care, however, to avoid even the ap-
pearance of judicial endorsement of the merits of the case.210
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented. 211 For
them, there is "no authority for such an extraordinary exercise of the
federal judicial power. ' 212 They concluded that while it is not unusual
for courts to supervise and regulate parties to an existing action, these
orders were not designed to facilitate the adjudication of any claim cur-
rently before the court.213
This case resolves an important practical question on which the
courts of appeals had ruled inconsistently, but its underlying facts are
quite narrow. In other cases, the court itself sent out the notice, 214 or the
attorney did SO, 2 15 both approaches are more problematic than the action
authorized in Sperling. Here, the court approved the text of the notice
but the plaintiff sent it. No appellate court reviewed the content of the
form in Sperling, although the Supreme Court's caution about the ap-
pearance of judicial endorsement suggests that the employer's worry is
that the uneducated public will be easily swayed by a notice it knows a
court has endorsed. It is a difficult to predict whether this notice proce-
dure will make ADEA class actions easier to bring. Certainly it will
expand the number of people likely to recover against an employer.
206. Id. at 488.
207. Id. at 486.
208. Id. at 487.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 488.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 488.
213. Id. at 488-489.
214. Id. at 484 n.l.
215. Id.
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B. University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 216
In University of Pennsylvania, the Court affirmed enforcement of an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") investigatory
subpoena. 217 In so doing, the Court refused to create a qualified common
law privilege for university peer review documents28 and rejected a
claim that the subpoena infringed on academic freedoms protected by the
first amendment. 219
The University of Pennsylvania denied tenure to Rosalie Tung, an
associate professor in the Wharton School of Business.220 Tung filed a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), alleging discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and na-
tional origin.22 1 The EEOC undertook an investigation of her charge
and requested a variety of information from the University. 222 The Uni-
versity asked the EEOC to exclude from its request materials that it
called "confidential peer review information," specifically: (1) confiden-
tial letters of evaluation; (2) the department chair's letter of evaluation;
(3) documents reflecting the internal deliberations of faculty committees
considering applications for tenure; and (4) comparable portions of ten-
ure-review files of five successful males.223 The EEOC denied the Uni-
versity's request, and applied to the district court for enforcement of its
subpoena.224 The district court enforced the subpeona, and the Third
Circuit affirmed. 225
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court
affirmed. In its defense, the university raised two claims. First, it urged
the Court to create a qualified common law privilege against disclosure
of confidential peer review materials. 226 The university argued that a
court must first determine that the particular access is necessary beyond
a showing of mere relevance, should be required before it orders those
materials to be disclosed to the EEOC.227 In rejecting the common law
216. 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
217. Id. at 589.
218. Id. at 582-85.
219. Id. at 585-88.
220. Id. at 580.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 580-81.
225. Id. at 581.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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privilege, the Court relied on Title VII and the fact that when Congress
amended it in 1972 to cover educational institutions, it did not grant any
exemptions or protections in the name of confidentiality. 228
Second, the university asserted a first amendment right of "aca-
demic freedom" against wholesale disclosure of the contested docu-
ments. 229 It argued that disclosing peer review materials violates the first
amendment because it undermines the confidentiality which is central to
the tenure process. In turn, the university argued, disclosure would stifle
determination of who will teach, a means by which universities exercise
their asserted academic-freedom right.230 In rejecting this argument, the
Court noted that in a typical academic freedom case, the government
attempts to control or direct the content of speech. 23' Here, the injury is
remote, attenuated, and speculative. 232 As Justice Blackmun noted, to
state the claim is to recognize how distant the burden is from the asserted
right.233
This decision addresses the narrow issue of the power of the govern-
ment to enforce a statutory right to investigate and to issue subpoenas. It
does not involve disclosure to the employee either as part of a lawsuit or
at some earlier stage, although some states may have laws requiring such
disclosure from public institutions.234 On these facts, the university had
a very difficult argument to make, asking essentially for the courts to
read precedent expansively and to create a protection. The decision
would have had a major impact if the Court had granted a qualified priv-
ilege. Then the question would have been whether other employers are
entitled to the same privilege because confidentiality plays an important
role in their employment decisions. The Court stated, "[w]e perceive no
limiting principle in [the university's] argument. '235 In not creating a
privilege or expansively reading precedent, the Court suggests that edu-
cational institutions do not deserve special treatment in terms of their
employment decisions.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 583.
230. Id. at 586.
231. Id. at 587-88.
232. Id. at 586.
233. Id. at 588.
234. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 5-14-3-4(b)(8) (Supp. 1990).
235. University of Pa, 110 S. Ct. at 585.
(Vol. 25
Winter 1991] LABOR EMPLOYMENT AND DISCRIMINATION CASES 349
C. Lytle v. Household Manufacturing236
In Lytle, the Court held that a district court's denial of relief on the
plaintiff's Title VII claim could not collaterally estop litigation of a re-
lated claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1981 ("section 1981"),237 which the
district court had erroneously dismissed.238 The Supreme Court found
that the seventh amendment entitled the plaintiff to a jury trial in litigat-
ing the erroneously dismissed section 1981 claim.239
John Lytle, an African-American, worked as a machinist for House-
hold Manufacturing. 240 The employer fired him following a purportedly
"unexcused" two-day absence under a company rule providing that more
than eight hours of "unexcused absences" within a twelve month period
was grounds for dismissal. 241 Lytle filed an action seeking damages and
injunctive relief under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
section 1981.242 He alleged that he had been treated differently from
white workers who had missed work and that, by providing inadequate
references to prospective employers, the employer had retaliated against
him for filing a charge with the EEOC.243 He requested a jury trial on all
triable issues.244
The district court dismissed the section 1981 claim by concluding
that Title VII was the exclusive remedy for Lytle's alleged injuries. 245
The court then conducted a bench trial of Lytle's Title VII claims. At
the close of Lytle's case, the court granted the employer's motion to dis-
miss the discharge claim; at the end of all the evidence, the court entered
a judgment in favor of the employer on the retaliation claim.246
The Fourth Circuit affirmed but noted that the district court erred
in dismissing the section 1981 claim.247 Nonetheless it ruled that the
district court's findings with respect to the Title VII claim now collater-
ally estopped Lytle from relitigating his section 1981 claim in the district
236. 110 S. Ct. 1331 (1990).
237. Section 1981 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll persons... shall have the same
right... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988).
238. Lytle, 110 S. Ct. at 1338.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1334.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1334-35.
244. Id. at 1335.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
court. 248 According to the Fourth Circuit, the seventh amendment,
which preserves the right to trial by jury, did not invalidate the lower
court's ruling on the collateral estoppel issue.249
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Marshall,
reversed. The employer did not dispute that, had the court not dismissed
the section 1981 claim, the plaintiff would have been entitled to a jury
trial. The jury trial would also have proceeded before the court consid-
ered the Title VII claims and would have included all issues common to
both claims. The Supreme Court reasoned that it would be anomalous to
hold that a district court may not deprive a litigant of his right to a jury
trial by resolving an equitable claim before a jury hears a legal claim
raising common issues, but that a court may accomplish the same result
by erroneously dismissing the legal claim.250
Lytle is in fact a very narrow holding on very specific facts. While it
resolves an inconsistency among federal courts of appeals, it does not add
importantly to employment discrimination law. Rather, Lytle is interest-
ing for two things the Court does not decide. First,since Lytle does not
argue that the seventh amendment entitles him to a jury trial of the Title
VII claims, the Court in a footnote stated "express no opinion on that
issue here. '251 In this footnote the Court cites Teamsters v. Terry,252
where the Court held six to three that an employee seeking relief in the
form of backpay for a union's alleged breach of its duty of fair represen-
tation (under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act) is
entitled to a jury trial. Terry at least raises the possibility of the Court
reaching a similar conclusion in Title VII. The right to a jury trial under
Title VII is also relevant to the employment discrimination amendments
currently before Congress.
Second, the Court did not decide whether Lytle's allegations of dis-
criminatory discharge and retaliation concerned conduct within the
scope of section 1981, as redefined by the Court's 1988 decision Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union.253 Patterson was decided after Lytle filed his
petition for certiorari but before the Court granted his petition. Accord-
ing to the record in Lytle, neither side made arguments based on Patter-
son to the courts below. On remand, therefore, the parties have the
chance to argue, and the court the opportunity to consider, whether dis-
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1336-37.
251. Id. at 1335 n.1.
252. 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990).
253. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
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criminatory discharge or retaliation claims relate to the formation or en-
forcement of contracts, the type of claim Patterson held are actionable
under section 1981, or relate only to "postformation conduct" unrelated
to enforcement of contracts, and therefore outside the scope of section
1981 as defined by Patterson.
D. Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v.
Smith 254
In Smith, the Court held that the first amendment does not preclude
state prohibition of the sacramental use of peyote, and therefore that un-
employment benefits may be denied to persons discharged for its use. 2 5
Alfred Smith and Galen Black were fired from their jobs at a drug
rehabilitation organization because they used peyote for sacramental pur-
poses at a ceremony of the Native American Church. Their applications
for unemployment compensation were denied because they were fired for
misconduct.256 The state court originally held that this denial of benefits
violated the first amendment. 257 The United States Supreme Court re-
manded for a determination whether sacramental peyote use came within
the state criminal drug law.258 Subsequently, the state court held that
such use did come within the state drug law but that the prohibition was
invalid under the free exercise clause.25 9 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the first amendment permits states to pro-
hibit sacramental peyote use and thus to deny unemployment benefits to
persons discharged because of its use. 260
Previous cases held that states could not condition the availability of
unemployment benefits on an individual's willingness to forgo conduct
required by his religion. 261 However, unlike the earlier cases, the law
prohibited the conduct in Smith. So, the question for the Supreme Court
was whether a state's inclusion of peyote in criminal law is constitutional
and the answer is yes. The Court refused to use the test in Sherbert v.
Verner 262 - government action that substantially burdens a religious
254. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
255. Id. at 1606. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion. Justice O'Connor concurred
in the judgment but not in the opinion. Id. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dis-
sented. Id. at 1615.
256. Id. at 1598.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1606.
261. Id. at 1598.
262. 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
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practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. 263 In-
stead, the Court leaves Sherbert as an unemployment compensation case,
stating that the free exercise clause does not apply to "generally applica-
ble criminal law.''264 While some states exempt religious use of peyote, a
state is not constitutionally required to do so. Smith is not a Title VII
case but does suggest that states have the power to enact legislation
which in other situations would amount to discrimination on the basis of
religion.
E. Yellow Freight v. Donnelly 265
In Donnelly, the Court held that state and federal courts have con-
current jurisdiction of claims brought under Title VII.266
Colleen Donnelly repeatedly applied for work with the defendant
employer, Yellow Freight.267 Over a period of one and one-half years,
the company claimed it had no vacancies, while it was in fact hiring
men. 268 Donnelly filed a complaint with the EEOC.269 The EEOC is-
sued a right to sue letter, which did not specify the forum but did state
that she had to file suit within ninety days. 270 Donnelly filed an action in
Illinois state court, alleging a violation of the Illinois Human Rights
Act.271 The employer filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that she
had failed to exhaust her state administrative remedies.272 She moved to
amend her complaint to include Title VII as a basis for her action.273
The employer then removed the case to federal court and filed a motion
to dismiss because the amendment had not been sought within the ninety
day period.27 4 The employer argued that filing in state court could not
toll the ninety day limitation period because the state court did not have
jurisdiction over the Title VII claim.275 Rejecting the exclusive jurisdic-
263. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
264. Id.
265. 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990).
266. Id. at 1570.
267. Id. at 1567.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1567-68.
270. Id. at 1568.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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tion claim, the district court decided for the plaintiff on the merits. 276
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 277
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court af-
firmed, resolving a split in the circuits in favor of nonexclusive jurisdic-
tion of Title VII claims. According to the Court, concurrent jurisdiction
lies at the core of our- federal system and Congress must make explicit its
decision to limit jurisdiction to federal courts.278 Nothing in the lan-
guage of Title VII precludes state court jurisdiction; nothing in the en-
forcement procedures is incompatible with state court jurisdiction. 27 9 It
is fairly clear that most informed observers of Title VII expected litiga-
tion to proceed exclusively in federal court, but this expectation does not
overcome the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.280
The Donnelly ruling expands the initial choices of fora for plaintiffs
in Title VII actions. This choice is limited however, as a practical mat-
ter, by the ease with which the defendant can remove the case to federal
court. If the case stays in state court, there are a host of problems like
the availability of damages or trial by jury if provided by state law.
F. Venegas v. Mitchell 281
In Venegas, the Court held unanimously that 42 U.S.C. section 1988
("section 1988") does not preclude collection of additional fees under a
contingent fee agreement.282
Juan Venegas entered into a contingent fee contract with defendant
Mitchell to bring a civil rights action against Long Beach police officers
for false arrest.283 Under the contract Mitchell was entitled to forty per-
cent of the gross amount recovered. 28 4 Venegas obtained a judgment of
$2.08 million. 285 Mitchell moved for attorney's fees under the Civil
Rights Attorneys Fee Act, now codified as section 1988,286 and the dis-
trict court awarded Venegas $117,000 in attorneys' fees payable by the
losing defendant.287 Mitchell then moved to intervene so he could attach
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1569-70.
280. Id. at 1570.
281. 110 S. Ct. 1679 (1990).
282. Id. at 1682-84.
283. Id. at 1681.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
287. Venegas, 110 S. Ct. at 1681 n.3.
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Venegas's recovery to satisfy the remainder of the contingent fee.288 The
district court denied intervention. 2 9 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the
district court had erred in denying intervention but agreed with the court
that section 1988 does not prevent a lawyer from collecting under a con-
tingent fee arrangement even if it exceeds the statutory award.29°
The Supreme Court affirmed, in an unanimous opinion by Justice
White, agreeing with a majority of the courts of appeals. Only the Tenth
Circuit had held that section 1988 placed a ceiling on an attorney's per-
missible recovery under a contingent fee contract. 29' The Supreme Court
acknowledged that in construing section 1988 it had rejected the contin-
gent fee model in favor of a model based on hours reasonably expended
compensated at reasonable rates.292 The Court also assumed that a dis-
trict court would not have been authorized to enhance the statutory at-
torneys' fees based on the contingency of nonrecovery in this particular
litigation. 293 But, according to the Court, it is still a "mighty leap" from
these propositions to the conclusion that section 1988 invalidates a pri-
vate agreement. 294 In sum, section 1988 controls what the losing defend-
ant must pay, not what the prevailing plaintiff must pay her lawyer.
G. Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission 295
In the only truly controversial civil rights case of the term, the
Court upheld an affirmative action plan in Metro Broadcasting v. Federal
Communications Commission, a case concerned with the constitutional
limitations on affirmative action, as was last term's decision in Richmond
v. JA. Croson.296
While Metro Broadcasting is not an employment or Title VII case, it
is important to employment discrimination law because the Court's view
of the relevant constitutional issues has an impact on both voluntary and
court-ordered affirmative action efforts under Title VII. The case is also
noteworthy in that, because Congress authorized the affirmative action
efforts at issue, Justice White voted with the majority to uphold the plan,
and Justice Brennan, who has since resigned from the Court, molded the
five-justice majority.
288. Id. at 1681.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1682.
291. Id. at 1681 n.l.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
296. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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The Court actually decided two cases, with different affirmative ac-
tion measures. In Metro Broadcasting, the Court considered the FCC's
policy of granting "qualitative enhancements" to minority license appli-
cants in comparative licensing proceedings. In such proceedings, the
Commission compares mutually exclusive applications for a new radio or
television station and looks principally at six factors: (1) diversification
of control of mass media communications; (2) fulltime participation in
station operation by owners; (3) proposed program service; (4) past
broadcast record; (5) efficient use of the frequency; and (6) the character
of the applicant. 297 Under the affirmative action component, the FCC
considered minority ownership and participation a "plus" to be weighed
with the other factors, here awarding the license to Rainbow Broadcast-
ing, a minority license applicant. 298 A competitor, Metro Broadcasting,
sought review of the FCC's order in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. A divided court affirmed the Commission's
order, upholding the "plus factor" as an appropriate affirmative action
effort. 299
Astroline Communications v. Shurberg Broadcasting3°° concerned
the FCC's "distress sale" program under which a broadcast licensee
whose license the FCC had indicated might be terminated or not re-
newed could sell its assets and transfer the license to a qualified minority
enterprise below the market value. 301 Here, too, the competitor Shurberg
Broadcasting challenged the FCC's approval of a distress sale before a
different panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A
divided court invalidated the Commission's distress sale policy because it
was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination or to promote
program diversity and it unduly burdened an innocent nonminority. 302
In upholding both affirmative action policies, a five-member major-
ity of the Court relied extensively on its 1980 decision in Fullilove v.
Klutznick,30 3 allowing a congressionally-mandated minority set aside
program, and distinguished quickly its 1989 decision in Richmond v. J.A.
Croson,304 striking down a minority set aside program adopted by the
297. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3004-3005.
298. Id. at 3005.
299. Id. at 3006-07.
300. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
301. Under ordinary rules, a licensee cannot sell its license when the FCC has indicated it
may terminate the license or not renew it.
302. Id. at 3007.
303. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
304. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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city council of Richmond, Virginia.30 5 In these FCC cases, the Court
rejected the strict scrutiny standard of review as well as the notion that
"remedying effects of past discrimination" was the only interest to meet
the strict scrutiny standard. 3°6 Instead, the Court held that
benign race-conscious measures authorized by Congress - even if
those measures are not 'remedial' in the sense of being designed to
compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination -
are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives. 307
The Court found the FCC's goal-to promote programming diversity-
was a sufficiently important governmental objective to provide a constitu-
tional basis for its affirmative action policies.308 The Court also deferred
to the determinations of the FCC and Congress that increased minority
participation in broadcasting would promote programming diversity. 3°9
Justice Stevens wrote separately to note his agreement derived from the
Court's rejection of the proposition that a racial classification is only per-
missible as a remedy for a past wrong.310 Since 1986, in Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education, he has argued that the Court should focus on the
future benefit, rather than remedial justification, of race-conscious
measures.
311
Justice O'Connor, author of the majority opinion in Croson last
term, wrote for the four dissenting justices. 312 Not surprisingly, she
argued (1) that the appropriate standard of review is strict scrutiny;
(2) that a remedial interest is necessary; (3) that an interest in program-
305. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008-28.
306. Id. at 3008.
307. Id. at 3008-09 (footnote omitted).
308. Id. at 3009-11.
309. Id. at 3016-17. Even Congress's approval of the affirmative action effort shows how
controversial affirmative action plans are. In 1986, the FCC began an inquiry regarding the
validity of its minority and female ownership policies, including the minority enhancement
credit. Before the FCC completed this inquiry, Congress enacted the FCC appropriations
legislation for fiscal 1988. The measure prohibited the Commission from spending any appro-
priated funds to examine or change its minority ownership policies. Id. at 3006 & n.9. Con-
gress has twice extended the prohibition on the use of the appropriated funds. Id. at 3016 &
n.30.
310. Id. at 3028 (Stevens, J., concurring).
311. 476 U.S. 267, 313-315 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Richmond v. J.A. Croson,
488 U. S., 469, 511-513 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
312. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3028. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Kennedy joined Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate
dissenting opinion in which Justice Scalia joined. Justice White was the fifth Justice for the
Croson majority, striking down a minority set aside program; here Justice White is the fifth
Justice upholding the FCC affirmative action efforts.
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ming diversity is not sufficiently important even if a lower level of scru-
tiny is used; (4) that other less discriminatory means are available to the
FCC, and finally; (5) that the FCC policies unduly burden and stigma-
tize innocent nonminority applicants. 313 Justice Kennedy wrote a sepa-
rate dissenting opinion, 314 expanding Justice O'Connor's point about
burdens and stigmas. He argued that racial classifications stigmatize
both the preferred and the excluded, that "benign" discrimination is not
easily identified, and that "broadcast diversity" is too trivial an interest
to support the FCC's race-conscious policy. 315
What is most interesting about the FCC cases, however, are the
opinions not written. Justice Scalia, the outspoken literalist who has
been harshly critical of affirmative action, did not write a new scathing
attack on affirmative action. The fact that the fifth amendment does not
contain an equal protection clause he would probably have bothered the
literalist in him; therefore have to agree with the majority that this fed-
eral governmental action did not violate the fifth amendment. More un-
explainable is why Justice White, who sided with the majority in Croson
votes with the majority here. The simple explanation is that these FCC
cases are on all fours with Fullilove in which Justice White voted to up-
hold the set aside program. Fullilove, however, was the last time Justice
White voted to uphold a race-conscious plan. In 1984, he authored the
majority opinion in Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts,3 16 rejecting a district
court's attempt to revise a voluntary affirmative action plan. In doing so
he implied that affirmative action was limited to identifiable victims of
proven discrimination. 31 7 Since then he has always voted to strike down
race-conscious measures, almost always with a separate opinion. 318
These opinions suggest that his position is not an absolutist's and perhaps
the answer to his vote in the FCC cases is that he finally found another
race conscious measure he could endorse. But this seems an odd case in
313. Id. at 3029-44.
314. Id. at 3044.
315. Id. at 3045.
316. 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehn-
quist, O'Connor, and Powell joined).
317. Id. at 579-80. The meaning of Stotts has been the subject of great controversy. See
Lamber, Observations on the Supreme Court's Recent Affirmative Action Cases, 62 IND. L.J.
243, 246-47 (1987); Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models for Racial Jus-
tice, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
318. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 294 (1986) (White, J., concur-
ring); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 531 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421, 499 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (White, J.,
dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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which to do so. Justice O'Connor is right in her critique of the affirma-
tive action effort of the FCC: it is not limited, not very particularized,
not based on persuasive evidence, and not remedial. For Justice White, it
must be the difference between Congress and local government imposing
the affirmative action obligation.
In other ways, these FCC cases are no different from the Court's
other affirmative action cases. Most of the Court would agree that race
seldom provides a relevant basis for disparate treatment and that classifi-
cations based on race are potentially harmful to everyone. But, the
Court remains deeply divided over crucial issues inherent in affirmative
action examinations, such as the appropriate standard of review, and
what governmental interests might justify race-conscious measures,
under what circumstances, and in spite of what alternatives. Justice
Brennan's resignation signals the loss of a strong proponent of affirmative
action measures. But other Justices, such as White and O'Connor, might
help form a majority upholding race conscious measures in particular
cases.
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